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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Union membership in the United States is declining, and if the current 
trend continues, unionization will no longer be relevant in the U.S. 
workplace.1  In 2015, the number of unionized wage and salary workers in 
the United States remained at a record low of 11.1%, or 14.8 million 
workers.2  A wide discrepancy between the public and private sector existed 
as only 6.7% of workers in the private sector were unionized.3  However, just 
over fifty years ago, in 1954, nearly 35% of wage and salary workers in the 
United States were members of a union.4  
Over time, low union participation may cause dramatic changes in the 
social and economic composition of the United States, especially for its 
middle class.  The growth of union membership in the mid-twentieth century 
is considered to be an important contributing factor in the development of the 
American middle class after the Second World War.5  The decline of union 
membership has likely contributed to the shrinking of the middle class in 
recent years.6  Additionally, scholars often describe the right to unionize as a 
“fundamental human and civil right,”7 and the freedom to unionize is 
considered to be “among the best means of ensuring the protections of a free 
society.”8  Supporters of unionization believe that when that freedom is taken 
for granted, “it is a civil right in peril.”9 
Opponents of unionization argue that unions lead to higher prices for 
consumers, undermine American competiveness with foreign industries, 
hinder the operation of a business with overly restrictive regulations, and, by 
compelling membership for certain positions, limit freedom in employment 
opportunities.  There are currently twenty-eight states in the United States 
that are “Right to Work” states.10  In these states, a company that is 
                                                                                                                   
 1 César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing with International Framework Agreements: An 
Exploratory Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 725, 731 (2014). 
 2 News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2015, 
USDL-15-0158, Table 3, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.  
 3 Id. 
 4 GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 23 (2004). 
 5 Marzán, supra note 1, at 731–33. 
 6 Id. 
 7 David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental Human and Civil Right, 9 
MISS. C. L. REV. 135, 135 (1988). 
 8 Id. at 144. 
 9 Id. at 136. 
 10 NRTW, National Right to Work Foundation Launches Missouri Task Force to Defend 
and Enforce New Right to Work Law, National Right to Work (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www. 
nrtw.org/news/missouritaskforce2122017/. 
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unionized cannot compel employees to become members of the union or to 
pay union dues.  These states protect employees from compulsory unionism 
by prohibiting union security agreements.11  At present, every state in the 
Southeast, including Georgia, maintains a “Right to Work” statute.12  As a 
result of these statutes, unions struggle to establish a significant presence in 
these states.  In 2015, only 4% of employed workers in Georgia were 
members of unions, and only 5.1% of jobs were covered by a union or 
employee association contract.13 
In 2014, the labor movement discovered a potential gateway into the 
Southeast through the foreign auto industry.  In early 2014, the United Auto 
Workers Union (UAW) met with leadership at Volkswagen (VW) regarding 
the possibility of unionizing the workforce at its Chattanooga, Tennessee 
plant.  The move would be unprecedented in the foreign auto industry in the 
United States.  Although the “Big Three” U.S. automakers—General Motors, 
Ford, and Chrysler (FCA US)—are unionized, foreign automakers operating 
plants in the United States have thus far remained union-free.  
If the UAW is successful in unionizing a major foreign auto company in a 
Southeast “Right to Work” state, it may be able to continue its success and 
increase the presence of unions in the Southeast.14  States that have a strong 
foreign industrial presence may see a surge in unionization rates among 
foreign-owned multinational companies.  In recent years, Georgia has 
witnessed a sizeable growth of foreign investment in the state.  Today, 
foreign investment by multinational corporations accounts for a substantial 
percentage of Georgia’s economy.15  Among these foreign investors, 
                                                                                                                   
 11 A union security agreement is an agreement between a labor union and employer that 
establishes whether the union may require employees, regardless of their union membership 
status, to pay union dues.  See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under 
the National Labor Relations Act: The Statue, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in 
Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 57 (1990). 
 12 Right to Work States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx. 
 13 News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Affiliation of 
Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, Table 5 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/uni 
on2.t05.htm.  Among states in the Southeast, Georgia ranks third in lowest unionization rates 
behind North Carolina and South Carolina. Id. 
 14 One way to spread unionization throughout an industry is through pattern bargaining.  
Pattern bargaining is a technique in which a union uses the terms from previously successful 
union-company agreements in its negotiations with other similar companies.  See Christopher 
L. Erickson, A Re-Interpretation of Pattern Bargaining, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 615 
(1996) (discussing settlements between major automobile companies and the UAW and 
examining inter- and intra-industry patterns in bargaining). 
 15 In 2014, 217,500 workers in Georgia were employed by foreign-controlled companies, 
accounting for 6.2% of private-industry employment at the time.  The four largest sources of 
foreign investment included Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada.  See Georgia 
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Germany has the most facilities in Georgia, with 424 locations across the 
state.16  In light of the significant presence of multinational corporations, the 
potential agreement with the UAW and Volkswagen in Tennessee may lead 
to a push in the labor movement in Georgia. 
The UAW has experienced some success in its initial negotiations with 
Volkswagen by introducing a plan to establish a European-style works 
council in the Chattanooga plant.17  In Germany, works councils are a major 
aspect of labor relations.18  By introducing a works council model into its 
bargaining agreement, the UAW has gained the attention of Volkswagen.  A 
series of setbacks in the UAW’s efforts have occurred, many of which stem 
from Tennessee’s status as a “Right to Work” state that has, to date, been 
largely opposed to the presence of unions. Furthermore, company unions 
have been found to be illegal under U.S. labor law.19  Nevertheless, if the 
UAW is able to overcome the hurdles and manage to unionize the 
Chattanooga plant with a works council model, it may attempt to capitalize 
on that success and expand to other foreign-owned companies in the South, 
including those in Georgia. 
This Note analyzes the proposed works council models at the 
Volkswagen Chattanooga plant.  It discusses whether the proposed models 
are legal under current U.S. labor law and considers the implications of the 
introduction of works councils on the future of U.S. labor relations in the 
largely anti-union Southeast.  The analysis concludes by considering 
employee co-determination in the workplace as a product of works councils 
and the likelihood of the establishment of collectively bargained works 
councils that are used to expand union membership in the union-resistant 
climate of Georgia and the Southeastern United States. 
                                                                                                                   
Exports, Jobs, and Foreign Investment, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Int’l Trade Admin., http:// 
www.trade.gov/mas/ian/statereports/states/ga.pdf. 
 16 Michaela Schobert, Georgia: The Nation’s Champion for Doing Business, GERMAN 
AMERICAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, http://www.gaccsouth.com/en/about-us/our-region/our-
region/georgia.  
 17 William Boston, VW and UAW to Meet for Talks on Car Maker’s Chattanooga Plant, 
WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vw-and-uaw-to-meet-for-talks-on-
car-makers-chattanooga-plant-1462134557. 
 18 See Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, The German Model of 
Corporate and Labor Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 39–40 (2000). 
 19 See Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (1993). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Workplace Democratization: Works Councils in Germany 
Unlike most law in Germany, which is codified into chapters by topic, 
German labor law is derived from several sources.20  Despite efforts in recent 
years to codify German labor law, the task has not yet been successful.21  
Instead, the law is a result of various national and international sources of 
labor law.  On a national level, both the German Civil Code and German 
labor courts have developed provisions and established legal principles 
relating to German labor law.22  Internationally, Germany must follow 
directives of the European Union and its associated courts.23  Germany is 
also a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organization (ILO).24 
Germany’s Works Constitution Act of 1972 (WCA) provides for the 
creation of shop level employee groups known as works councils in 
individual workplaces.25  German-style works councils may be defined as 
“institutionalized bodies for representative communication between a single 
employer . . . and the employees . . . of a single plant or enterprise.”26  Works 
councils are independent of a union and represent all workers of a plant 
regardless of union membership.27  German works councils differ from 
unions in that they do not negotiate for wages and benefits, and they do not 
organize strikes when there is a dispute between employees and 
management.28  German works councils are representative of the workforce 
at a specific company, not of an entire industry.29  Today, works councils are 
mandatory and encompassing in Germany’s private sector.30  Because they 
are representative bodies involved in the determination of a company’s 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Walter Ahrens & Mark S. Dichter, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 5-1 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds., 4th ed. 2015). 
 21 Id. at 5-2. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 5-3 (noting that Courts such as the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights may address issues involving labor). 
 24 Id. at 5-4. 
 25 See generally Thilo Ramm, Co-determination and the German Works Constitution Act of 
1972, 3 INDUS. L.J. 20 (1974). 
 26 JOEL ROGERS & WOLFGANG STREECK, WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, 
REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 6 (1995). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 7 (noting that works councils in other countries, such as Spain and Italy, do have 
the power to negotiate wages and call strikes). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 55. 
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direction, works councils serve to make employees stakeholders in their 
employers.31  Works councils coexist in Germany with industry-wide labor 
unions.32  These unions operate as centralized structures with headquarters 
that determine industry-wide strategies and policies that are implemented 
throughout Germany.33 
B.   The Illegality of Works Councils Under U.S. Labor Law 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935 to protect 
the rights of both employees and employers.34  Section 7 of the Act provides 
that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”35  Section 
8 of the Act addresses unfair labor practices.  Specifically, Section 8(a)(2) 
provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”36  In applying the 
law, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the United States 
Supreme Court have determined that a “company union” is a form of 
domination that is prohibited by Section 8(a)(2).37 
Today, the controlling case regarding the formation of works councils in 
the United States is Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.38  In Electromation, the 
employer established “employee action committees” to provide a method for 
employees to initiate proposals to develop bilateral solutions for issues in the 
workplace.39  The employer was responsible for establishing the committees, 
designing the committee structure, and providing employees with pay during 
committee activities.40  The Seventh Circuit determined that the actions 
committees constituted labor organizations.  The court pointed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co.41  In Cabot 
                                                                                                                   
 31 ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 396 (2007). 
 32 See id. at 404. 
 33 Id. at 405. 
 34 NLRB, National Labor Relations Act, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-rela 
tions-act (last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
 35 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014). 
 36 Id. § 158. 
 37 See generally NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). 
 38 35 F.3d 1148 (1994). 
 39 Id. at 1151–52. 
 40 Id. at 1152–53. 
 41 360 U.S. 203. 
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Carbon, the Supreme Court held that in defining what constitutes a labor 
organization, the NLRA intended to include conduct much broader than 
collective bargaining in its use of the phrase “dealing with.”42  Thus, the 
Electromation committees were controlled by the Act and subject to its 
restrictions.  As such, the court found that the creation of the committees 
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the Act.43  The court looked to the 
legislative history of the NLRA to make its determination.  The court held 
that the language in the legislation “[illustrated] the broad proscription on 
employer interference that Section 8(a)(2) was designed to provide.”44  
Because the employer in Electromation participated in the internal 
management of the committees, supervised the procedure of meetings, and 
actively participated in framing the purposes and goals of the organizations, 
its actions qualified as interfering with or dominating the labor 
organization.45  The court concluded that “the principal distinction between 
an independent labor organization and an employer-dominated organization 
lies in the unfettered power of the independent organization to determine its 
own actions.”46  Thus, in Electromation, the court established a broad net 
limiting the ways employers may participate in the operation of a labor 
union. As a result, works councils and similarly structured labor 
organizations remain absent in the U.S. labor movement. 
C.  The Attempt to Organize the Volkswagen Plant in Chattanooga 
In order to gain a foothold in the union-hostile Southeast, the UAW 
proposed establishing what union officials have described as a “totally new 
                                                                                                                   
 42 See id. at 211–12.  Section 2(5) of the NLRA states,  
The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any 
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, 
hours of employment, or conditions of work. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012). 
 43 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer “to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).  Section 8(a)(2) of the 
NLRA states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere 
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other 
support to it.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012). 
 44 Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1164 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1170. 
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form of representation.”47  By late 2013, the UAW claimed to have a “solid 
majority”48 of workers at the Chattanooga plant signing union authorization 
cards favoring representation.49  The collection of authorization cards is an 
alternative form of establishing union representation in the workplace.50  The 
UAW, with its proposition of establishing a works council at the plant, 
gained the support of Volkswagen’s Global Works Council.51  This support 
was key because multinational transplant automakers had avoided 
unionization in their plants in the Southeast.  Despite the support, the union 
had difficulty gathering the majority of the plant’s employees and lost the 
representation election in February 2014. 
Although the UAW lost the election in February 2014, labor relations 
experts still believe that, in time, the Volkswagen plant will be unionized.52  
After the February election, the UAW established a permanent presence in 
the area with the creation of Local 42.53  At the same time, workers opposed 
to representation from the UAW established their own local labor 
organization called the American Council of Employees (ACE).54  Each 
organization then submitted its own plan to establish a works council at the 
plant.  The UAW plan involved a dual model where the UAW and 
Volkswagen would establish the works council in the collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA).  The bargaining process would specify the role and power 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Associated Press, Majority of Workers at Chattanooga VW Plant Have Signed Union 
Cards, UAW Says, TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/ 
local/story/2013/sep/11/majority-workers-chattanooga-vw-plant-have-signed-/118498. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 If the union, during its organization campaign, gains the support of over 50% of 
employees, it will collect and submit union authorization cards.  At that point, an election is 
unnecessary to establish representation.  If, however, the union has less than a majority, but 
has over 30% of workers sign authorization cards, there will be an election conducted by the 
NLRB.  What We Do: Conduct Elections, NLRB (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nlrb.gov/what 
-we-do/conduct-elections. 
 51 Letter from Berthold Huber, President, IndustriALL Global Union, to Volkswagen 
Employees in Chattanooga (Dec. 18, 2013); Letter from Berthold Huber, President, 
IndustriALL Global Union, to Members of UAW Local 42 (July 18, 2014), http://uaw.org/ 
app/uploads/2015/09/UAW-VW-Works-Council-Documents.pdf. 
 52 Jake Holmes, The Latest on the 2015 UAW Talks, From an Expert, AUTOMOBILE (Oct. 2, 
2015), http://www.automobilemag.com/news/the-latest-on-2015-uaw-talks-from-an-expert/. 
 53 UAW Local 42 & International Union, UAW, Vision Statement for a Collectively 
Bargained Works Council at Volkswagen Chattanooga (May 7, 2015), http://uaw.org/app/up 
loads/2015/09/UAW-VW-Works-Council-Documents.pdf. 
 54 American Council of Employees, Constitution & Bylaws, 1, http://www.americancouncil 
ofemployees.com/uploads/2/2/0/0/22009070/ace_constitution_and_bylaws_10-20-14.pdf. 
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of the works council while reserving other responsibilities for the union.55  
The ACE, however, proposed the establishment of three separate committees 
which, taken as a whole, would establish what it considers to be the 
equivalent of a German-style works council.56 
In October 2015, the UAW petitioned the NLRB for a new election to 
organize the plant’s 164 maintenance workers.  Unlike the election in 2014, 
this time Volkswagen leadership at the plant expressed dissatisfaction at the 
new organization attempt.  In a letter written by the plant’s CEO and the 
plant’s Executive Vice President of Human Resources, the company stated 
that it “finds the timing of this development unfortunate, given the 
challenges we are facing as a plant, Brand, and Group.”57  The letter also 
highlighted the differences between the requested election and the 2014 
election.58  Specifically, the letter stated that “[t]here is no clear path to a 
Works Council representing all employees from a bargaining unit 
representing only the maintenance team.”59  This new approach by the UAW 
would utilize “micro-bargaining” units in the factory.60 
Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam commented on the new election attempt 
by the UAW.  Echoing the Volkswagen letter, Haslam stated that the “timing 
isn’t great”61 for the pursuit of a new election.  Haslam and other state 
political leaders had previously warned against unionization of the plant 
during the 2014 election.62 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Agreement for a Representation Election between UAW & Volkswagen Group of 
America, Exhibit B, 2 (Jan. 27, 2014), http://uaw.org/app/uploads/2015/09/UAW-VW-Works-
Council-Documents.pdf. 
 56 American Council of Employees, Works Council Concept Summary, 1–2 (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.americancouncilofemployees.com/uploads/2/2/0/0/22009070/works_council_conc
ept_apr2015.pdf. 
 57 Letter from Christian Koch, CEO Chattanooga Operations & Sebastian Patta, Exec. Vice 
President, Human Resources, to Volkswagen Employees in Chattanooga (Oct. 23, 2015).  The 
difficulties mentioned in the letter likely refer to the Volkswagen emissions scandal that came 
to light earlier in the year. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. The letter also highlights the fact that the petition for election was submitted by the 
UAW, not Volkswagen, that there was no Election agreement between the UAW and 
Volkswagen, and that the outcome would only affect the maintenance workers. 
 60 The method of collective bargaining in U.S. labor law focuses on bargaining units.  Thus, 
the entire workforce of an organization does not necessarily have to unionize.  Instead, distinct 
bargaining units can be formed for specific positions.  See Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. 
No. 83 (2011), enforced sub. nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Mike Pare & Andy Sher, Haslam: 'Timing isn’t great’ for UAW at VW Chattanooga, 
TIMES FREE PRESS (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregi 
on/story/2015/oct/28/haslam-timing-isnt-great-uaw-vw-chattanooga/332867/. 
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In mid-November 2015, the NLRB held a two-day hearing to determine 
whether the proposed maintenance worker bargaining unit qualified under 
U.S. labor law.  The NLRB granted the petition to hold the vote.63  The 
UAW also announced that it would be creating a partnership called the 
Transnational Partnership Initiative (TPI) with IG Metall, Germany’s largest 
trade union.64  The primary goals of the TPI would be to “explore new 
models of employee representation in the United States,” to “collaborate to 
improve wages and working conditions for employees at German-owned 
auto manufacturers and suppliers in the U.S. South,” and to “[e]xpand on the 
principle of ‘co-determination’ between management and employees by 
establishing German-style works councils or similar bodies to promote 
employee representation.”65 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  UAW’s Proposed Dual Model 
Presently, the Volkswagen Plant in Chattanooga is the only Volkswagen 
assembly plant that does not operate with a works council.66  As such, in 
proposing to unionize the plant, the UAW proposed a works council model 
that was “in accordance with . . . the spirit of the Volkswagen Group culture 
as reflected in its Social Charter and Charter on Labor Relations.”67  In this 
statement, the UAW was referring to the Global Labour Charter signed by 
the VW Board of Management, the International Metalworkers’ Federation, 
and the VW Global Group Works Council.68  The Charter distinguishes three 
stages of participation for Volkswagen employees.69 The first stage is the 
right to receive information, while the second stage establishes consultation 
                                                                                                                   
 63 Erik Schelzig, UAW Taking ‘Micro’ Approach Toward Collective Bargaining at 
Volkswagen Plant in Tennessee, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www. 
usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/11/19/uaw-taking-micro-approach-to-unionizing-vol 
kswagen-plant. 
 64 Press Release, United Automobile Workers of America (Nov. 19, 2015), http://uaw.org/ 
uaw-ig-metall-announce-u-s-partnership/. 
 65 Id. 
 66 David Barkholz & Ryan Beene, UAW Pushes to Form Works Council at VW 
Chattanooga Plant, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (May 7, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.autonew.com/ 
article/20150507/OEM01/150509882/uaw-pushes-to-form-works-council-at-vw-chattanooga-
plant. 
 67 Agreement for a Representation Election, Exhibit B, supra note 55, at 4. 
 68 See Press Release, IndustriALL Global Union, Global Labour Charter Signed with VW 
(Apr. 11, 2009), http://www.industriall-union.org/archive/imf/global-labour-charter-signed-wi 
th-vw. 
 69 Id. 
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rights for employees, and the third stage includes rights of codetermination.70  
The Charter’s language demonstrates Volkswagen’s commitment to 
“sustainable corporate governance . . . founded on a performance-based and 
participatory culture . . . to secure and promote competitiveness and 
efficiency while also helping to secure and develop jobs and workforce 
employability.”71  The UAW’s proposed Dual Model incorporates several 
aspects of the Charter, including the three stages of employee participation.72  
The UAW proposal states that the works council would be established during 
the collective bargaining negotiation between the union and Volkswagen.73  
Once the specifics are agreed upon, the works council would be included in 
the initial collective bargaining agreement.74  
The functioning of the works council would be “guided by” and 
“consistent with the terms of the CBA relative to represented employees.”75  
The responsibilities of the works council would include making decisions by 
majority vote for the good of the employees and employer, representing the 
interests of employees in the day-to-day running of the plant, dealing with 
complaints and suggestions, serving as the contact for management for all 
intra-company issues concerning topics and tasks assigned to the works 
council under the CBA, communicating to the employees concerning the 
council’s activities, discussing and negotiating ideas and other intra-company 
needs with management, acting in a respectful and non-discriminatory 
manner, conducting its activities in a manner that ensures compliance with 
regulations and adherence to applicable laws, and carrying out operational 
management regarding designated matters.76  The UAW also noted that the 
implementation of the works council would be a gradual transition, with the 
employer retaining the responsibilities until the works council is in a position 
to assume them.77  In a later proposal, the UAW included several specific 
examples of potential duties of the works council.78 
                                                                                                                   
 70 Id. 
 71 Charter on Labour Relations within the Volkswagen Group, VOLKSWAGEN (2009) 1, 
https://www.volkswagenag.com/presence/nachhaltigkeit/documents/policy-intern/2009%20C 
harta%20on%20Labour%20Relations%20EN.pdf. 
 72 Agreement for a Representation Election, Exhibit B, supra note 55, at 4. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 2. 
 75 Id. at 3, 5. 
 76 Id. at 5, 6. 
 77 Id. at 8. 
 78 Vision Statement for a Collectively Bargained Works Council, supra note 53, at 10–20. 
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B.  ACE’s Proposed Committee Model 
The American Council of Employees opposes the UAW as the 
representative for the workers at the Volkswagen plant but recognizes 
Volkswagen’s interest in establishing a works council model at the plant to 
bring it more in line with its plants in Europe.79  Members of the ACE 
believe that the UAW was “integrally involved” in the struggles of the 
Detroit automakers during the recession.80  The ACE, however, recognizes 
the importance of establishing a method of employee representation at the 
plant.81  In its constitution, the ACE states that its objective is “to improve 
the general welfare of all employees, foster mutual understanding and 
cooperation, improve the workmanship, quality and grade of 
Volkswagen . . . products, and develop a higher degree of efficiency in their 
occupations.”82  The ACE proposed its own works council concept in April 
2015 as an alternative to the UAW’s proposal.83 
The model in the proposal splits the traditional functions of a single 
works council into three distinct committees.  The ACE suggests that the 
systems “may perform practically all of the traditional works council 
functions, fostering communication and efficiency and encouraging 
employee participation.”84  The three-committee system would include an 
Operational Committee, an Employee Input Committee, and a Management-
Style Adjudicatory Committee.85  The Operational Committee would focus 
on “flow and efficiency, quality, outreach, vendor selection, community 
involvement, teamwork, and customer relations.”86  The Employee Input 
Committee would provide communication within the plant and allow the 
sharing of ideas to Volkswagen.87  The model recognizes that implementing 
any of the ideas shared by the Employee Input Committee would ultimately 
be at Volkswagen’s discretion.  The Management-Style Adjudicatory 
Committee would deal with terms and conditions of employment.88  This 
committee would undertake certain managerial functions that would not be 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Works Council Concept Summary, supra note 56, at 1.  
 80 Lydia DePillis, The Strange Case of the Anti-Union Union at Volkswagen’s Plant in 
Tennessee, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/ 
2014/11/19/the-strange-case-of-the-anti-union-union-at-volkswagens-plant-in-tennessee/. 
 81 American Council of Employees, supra note 54, at 1. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1–2. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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subject to review by Volkswagen other than for “budgetary, financial, or 
similar constraints.”89 
The ACE, in recognition of the restrictions placed on committees by 
Electromation, includes explanations as to why the committees would not be 
in violation of U.S. labor law in its proposal.  The Operational Committee 
would not address terms and conditions of employment.90  Furthermore, the 
Employee Input Committee would avoid the “dealing with” concern by not 
engaging in “back-and-forth proposals with management,” and it would not 
poll employees to determine majority positions on topics.91 
C.  Legality of Proposed Models 
Even if the UAW is successful at organizing the workforce at the 
Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, questions will still exist as to whether the 
proposed works council model would be legal under the Electromation 
framework.  Critics suggest that the proposed model is not actually a new 
form of representation, but instead is a campaign tactic by the UAW to gain 
the support of foreign companies that use works councils.92  Critics 
additionally point to restrictions imposed on unions that the UAW did not 
address in its proposal.93  
Once a union is established as the exclusive representative for a 
bargaining unit, it then has a fiduciary responsibility of fair representation.  
This prevents the union from placing its own institutional interests ahead of 
the employees.94  Those who oppose the UAW proposal’s legality suggest 
that establishing the works council would be an illegal transfer of 
responsibilities from the union to the employer.95  Accordingly, “any attempt 
by a traditional labor union to delegate responsibility to a works council to 
negotiate over any terms and conditions of employment, process grievances, 
or any other duty of representation, is impermissible under the NLRA.”96  
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See WORKFORCE FREEDOM INITIATIVE, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: A NEW ORGANIZING 
PARADIGM? WORKS COUNCILS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, https://www.uscham 
ber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/u.s._chamber_works_council_report_0.pdf. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 14–15. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 16. 
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Critics point to additional factors that they believe put the proposed model at 
odds with the NLRA.97 
The UAW believes that the critics are mistaken.  In response to 
suggestions about the illegality of its proposal, the President of the UAW 
Local 42 stated that “the union and the company believed the concept was 
compatible with state and federal laws, aligned with the UAW’s policies, and 
is consistent with the company’s unique brand of co-determination between 
management and employees.”98  The ACE also commented on the issue, 
stating that “the goal is to get as close as you can without violating U.S. labor 
law.”99 
D.  Implications to the Auto Industry in the Southeast and Georgia 
If the UAW is successful and the works council proposal is implemented 
into the CBA between the union and Volkswagen, there are various 
implications to the future of labor organization in the Southeast.  While 
Georgia is not home to a German auto plant as Alabama, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee are, it has seen a recent increase in German foreign investment. 
Among recent developments was the construction of the U.S. headquarters of 
Porsche, a German automaker in Atlanta, which is now home to 
approximately 400 employees. 100  
Georgia would not be insulated from the union’s attempts to expand into 
the Southeast.  It is likely that the UAW would want to capitalize on its 
success by attempting to organize other German-owned auto manufacturing 
plants in the Southeast, including several plants in the Right to Work states, 
such as the Mercedes Benz plant in Alabama and the BMW plant in South 
Carolina.  Like Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes Benz have unions with 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Id. at 24 (“First, a works council would be at odds with exclusive representation; second, 
a union cannot delegate its duty of representation; third, a transfer of this duty would act as a 
“disclaimer of interest”; fourth, employer engagement with the works council would represent 
illegal “direct dealing”; fifth, a works council would likely violate union constitutions and 
bylaws; sixth, legal questions would be raised around the appropriate unit; seventh, 
professional employees may not automatically be included in a works council; eighth, 
supervisory employees could not participate in a works council, rendering the concept 
ineffective; and finally, the NLRA prohibits an employer from providing support to a works 
council, which would be considered improper domination or assistance.”). 
 98 Mike Pare, U.S. Chamber Says Works Council at VW Chattanooga Plant Would Be 
Unlawful, TIMES FREE PRESS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/ 
aroundregion/story/2015/nov/18/vw-chattanooga-works-council-doesnt-fit-us-law-report-says/ 
336357/. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Press Release, Porche Cars North America, Porsche to Build New U.S. Headquarters in 
Atlanta (May 12, 2011), http://press.porsche.com/news/pdf/Porsche_Aerotropolis_release.pdf. 
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strong influence in Germany.  Thus, the UAW would likely attempt to use 
the dual model works council as a form of pattern bargaining with the other 
Southeast plants.  Moreover, if unionization begins to take hold at other 
foreign auto plants in the Southeast, it is possible that new investment by 
foreign automakers may suffer.  For example, at one point Tennessee seemed 
likely to be the location of a new Audi plant in the United States.  Audi, 
however, chose to locate the plant in Mexico, where it would have 
substantial labor cost savings.101 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The UAW has expressed its commitment to expansion into the American 
Southeast, and with its moves in recent years, there is no doubt that it will 
continue to fight to establish its presence in Right to Work states.  The UAW 
has shown its creativity by incorporating a works council into future 
bargaining agreements with foreign owned companies in the United States.  
Achieving cooperation from Volkswagen in 2014, was a significant 
achievement for the UAW, but the union has since had difficulties gaining 
the support it needs to organize Volkswagen’s plant in Chattanooga.  
Additionally, the recent emissions scandal has shifted Volkswagen’s interest 
away from the UAW’s organization attempts.  Nevertheless, the UAW’s 
recent partnership with IG Metall demonstrates its commitment to moving 
forward with its new approach.  If, in time, the UAW is successful in 
establishing a works council in the United States, it may finally gain a 
foothold in the Southeast, which would allow it to pattern bargain with other 
foreign-owned companies in the region.  Georgia, which leads the region in 
foreign investment, would certainly be a target for the UAW’s expansion 
efforts.  Before this can happen, however, the UAW will likely have to 
submit its model to the NLRB—and potentially to the federal court system—
to scrutinize its legality.  The current, labor-friendly Board may find that the 
dual model is consistent with U.S. labor law, but if the composition of the 
Board changes as a result of the 2016 presidential election and the UAW has 
not yet established itself as the representative of the Volkswagen plant, its 
model would likely be found to be illegal by an employer-friendly Board. 
 
                                                                                                                   
 101  Additionally, Kia Motors America Inc., which has its headquarters in Atlanta and which 
built its first U.S. plant in Georgia, chose to build a second plant in Mexico in August of 2014.  
See James R. Healey, Kia to Build $1 Billion Mexico Small-Car Plant, USA TODAY (Aug. 27, 
2014, 5:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/08/27/kia-billion-factory-
mexico/14699535/. 
